



Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA) Schema Extension Users Guide



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GENESYS 2026 FMEA Extension Overview

Rev B




CSDL

COMPREHENSIVE
SYSTEMS DESIGN
LANGUAGE

*FMECA Language
Extension*

Outline

- FMECA Overview
- Review of Legacy Capabilities
- Overview of New Capabilities
 - Mapping to FMECA Fundamentals
 - General FMEA Process
 - GENESYS 2026 FMECA Extension Capabilities
 - Schema Overview
 - Facility
 - Hierarchy Definition
 - FMEA Table using Excel Connector
- Capabilities in Action – Example
- Conclusions & Wrap Up



FMEA - Introduction

- Failure Modes and Effects Analysis is a technique to identify potential failure modes in a system and their causes and effects.
- Inductive reasoning technique is important to reliability, safety, and quality engineering.
 - Functional FMEA – top down
 - Physical FMEA – bottom up
- Once causes and effects are identified, mitigations can be developed to do one or more of the following:
 - Decrease the probability of occurrence (or design it out)
 - Decrease the impact of the effect
 - Increase the probability of detection (so that a responsive action can take place as quickly as possible).
- Sometimes referred to as a FMECA, with the “C” standing for “Criticality”


FMEA Standards

- **IEC 60812:2018** – *Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA and FMECA)*
- **MIL-STD-1629** – *Procedures for Performing a Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis*
- **SAE J-1739** - *Potential Failure Mode And Effects Analysis In Design (Design FMEA), Potential Failure Mode And Effects Analysis In Manufacturing And Assembly Processes (Process FMEA)*
- **AIAG & VDA FMEA Handbook**

+ *many other domain specific standards and handbooks...*

Legacy GENESYS FMEA Capabilities

- Extension released in 2017
- Schema extension allows for the capture of:
 - Failure Mode
 - Failure Cause
 - Failure Reduction
 - Tie resolution classes back in main model
- Hierarchy Definition for Failure Reduction
- Excel Connector – 3 Table Definitions for standardized tabular reports




System Element	Failure	Failure Description	Severity	Cause of Failure	Occurrence	Detection Method	Detectability
Cooling Motor and Fan Assembly	Fan Vibration and Interference	Audible Noise, vibration; increased motor wear.	5	Fan Center of Gravity off axis of rotation causing 2-plan imbalance.	5	Design calls for lightweight fan with minimum band mass, part thickness.	4
Cooling Motor and Fan Assembly	Misalignment of Fan and Shroud	Fan and shroud mis-aligned cause reduction or complete loss of	7	Fan contacts shroud, noise or motor burnout.	2	Designed for easy assembly and alignment.	3
Cooling Motor and Fan Assembly	Motor Burnout	Motor Burnout causes loss of cooling to the system.	5	Overheating of motor assembly due to lack of air circulation around motor.	2	Vent holes in motor casing, fins in fan hub pull air through motor body.	5
Cooling Motor and Fan Assembly	Reduced Fan Efficiency	Fan motor is assembled 120 degrees off nominal angle causes reduction of cooling effectiveness.	6	Symmetrical spacing of screw holes allows for non-unique mounting of fan motor.	7	Current design requires visual verification of assembly.	7
				Misassembly of Fan and Motor causes pinched wire.	7	Visual Inspection of Fan and Motor assembly.	6

Deprecated with the release of
G2026 FMECA Extension

Overview of the Enhanced G2026 FMECA Capabilities

General FMECA Process




Adapted from: ***Systems Engineering and Analysis***, 3rd ed by Blanchard & Fabrycky


Enhanced FMECA with GENESYS Capabilities

- Model each of the following as first-class objects:
 - **Failure Mode**
 - **Failure Cause**
 - **Failure Effect**
 - **Failure Detection**
 - **Failure Prevention Control**
- Usage of the existing **Mitigation Activity** class
- Concepts can be either modeled:
 - *general* (SysML concept of “element of definition”)
 - *specific* to surrounding content (SysML concept of “element of usage”)
- Relationship attributes for context-specific evaluations
 - Occurrence
 - Severity
 - Difficulty of Detection

An Integrated “Uncertainty” Modeling Schema



Enhanced FMECA Schema



Risk Priority Number (RPN)

Occurrence

1 - Almost Never
2 - Remote
3 - Very Slight
4 - Slight
5 - Low
6 - Medium
7 - Moderately High
8 - High
9 - Very High
10 - Almost Certain



Severity

1 - None
2 - Very Slight
3 - Slight
4 - Minor
5 - Moderate
6 - Significant
7 - Major
8 - Extreme
9 - Serious
10 - Hazardous



Probability of Detection

1 - Almost Certain
2 - Very High
3 - High
4 - Moderately High
5 - Moderate
6 - Low
7 - Very Low
8 - Remote
9 - Very Remote
10 - None




RPN

RPN is a number between 1 and 1,000

The higher the number the more critical it is to address first!

FMECA Facility


- Included with Schema Extension
- Contains all classes associated with GENESYS FMECA capabilities
 - FMEA Classes
 - Failure Mode
 - Failure Cause
 - Failure Effect
 - Failure Detection
 - Failure Prevention Control
 - Mitigation Activity
 - Failure Mode generating or impacted classes
 - Component, Function, Interface, Link, Item, Requirement, Verification Requirement
 - Related Classes
 - Category, Change Request Package, Document, ExternalFile, Text, Risk




FMECA Hierarchy Definitions

- Included with Schema Extension
 - FMEA
 - FMEA Generalization
- Can be used with:
 - Hierarchy diagram
 - Spider diagram
- Can then be coupled with:
 - Rule Sets
 - Node Templates

The screenshot shows the 'Hierarchy Definition Editor' window. It has a title bar with a 'G' logo and the text 'Hierarchy Definition Editor'. Below the title bar is a header area with a 'G' logo and the text 'Manage hierarchy definitions by defining what relationships and target classes to use for the hierarchy diagramming below.' The main area is divided into four sections: 'Stored Definitions', 'Properties', 'Relations', and 'Target Classes'. The 'Stored Definitions' section has a dropdown menu set to 'FMEA Hierarchy' and 'Save' and 'Delete' buttons. The 'Properties' section has a 'Label' field set to 'FMEA Hier', a 'Show Relationships*' checkbox which is checked, and an 'Essential' checkbox which is unchecked. The 'Relations' section has two lists of relationship types: 'accomplished by', 'accomplishes', 'acquires', 'acts as', 'affected by', 'affects', 'controlled by', 'created by', 'detected by', 'embodied in', and 'introduced by'. The 'Target Classes' section has two lists of target classes: 'Category', 'Change Request Package', 'Component', 'Concern', 'ConnectingUnit', 'ConstraintDefinition', 'Component', 'Failure Cause', 'Failure Detection', 'Failure Effect', 'Failure Mode', and 'Failure Prevention Control'. At the bottom are 'OK' and 'Cancel' buttons. A footnote at the bottom states: '*The Show Relationships setting is used the first time a diagram is opened.'



FMEA Generalization



FMEA

Rule Set – FMECA Color Coding

- Included with Schema Extension
- Can be used with:
 - Hierarchy diagram
 - Spider diagram
- Colors Failure Modes and associated classes with a consistent color scheme

The screenshot shows the 'Edit Rule Set' dialog box for 'FMEA Color Coding'. The dialog has a title bar with standard window controls. Below the title bar, there is a blue header area with a yellow icon and text: 'Edit the rule set for this diagram by adjusting the rules, actions, and conditions below. Note there are tabs for the different rule types.' Below this, there are fields for 'Name' (FMEA Color Coding) and 'ID' (cf3b6ef7-4708-4ff7-b2e0-9d7613d58c1b). The main area is divided into three sections: 'Node Rules', 'Conditions', and 'Actions'. The 'Node Rules' section has a 'Rule' field set to 'Failure Effect', a 'Show on Legend' checkbox checked, and a 'Legend Label' field set to 'Failure Effect'. The 'Conditions' section has a table with columns 'Not', 'Type', and 'Options'. The 'Actions' section has a table with columns 'Type' and 'Options'. At the bottom, there are tabs for 'Diagram Rules (0)', 'Node Rules (6)', and 'Line Rules (0)'. The 'Node Rules' tab is selected. At the bottom right, there are buttons for 'Save As...', 'Save', and 'Cancel'.

Diagram Rules (0) Node Rules (6) Line Rules (0)

Save As... Save Cancel

Table Definition

- Included with Schema Extension
- Standard tabular format for Physical FMECA

GENESYS Table Definition - "FMEA Extension with Sample"

Table Definition

FMEA Component View Table

☐ Essential

Save Save As Delete

Filter: All Entities

Sort Block: Alphabetic

Default Class: Category

To Sheet: (current) ☒ Auto-format the worksheet ☐ Allow Transform Entities

Add Remove Clear

Class / Folder Package

All items Clear

- ☐ Category
- ☐ Change Request Package
- ☒ Component
- ☐ Concern
- ☐ ConstraintDefinition
- ☐ DefinedTerm
- ☐ Document
- ☐ DomainSet
- ☐ Event
- ☐ Exit
- ☐ ExternalFile
- ☐ Failure Cause
- ☐ Failure Detection
- ☐ Failure Effect
- ☐ Failure Mode

Position	Type	Data / Definition	Based On	Header	Repeat Data	Sort Block	Default Target Class	Single Cell	Show Column
1	Entity Attribute	number	Data	Comp No.	☐				
2	Entity Attribute	name	Data	Component Name	☐				
3	Relationship ...	associated with	Data	associated with T...	☐	Alphabetic	Category	☐	☐
4	Entity Attribute	number	3	FM No	☐				
5	Entity Attribute	name	3	Failure Mode	☐				
6	Relationship ...	created by	3	Failure Cause	☐	Alphabetic	Category	☐	☐
7	Entity Attribute	number	6	FC No.	☐				
8	Relationship	created by	3	Failure Cause	☐	Alphabetic	Category	☐	☒
9	Relationship ...	occurrence	8	Occ	☐				

Load Cancel

Installing and Sample




Extension Contents

- The GENESYS 2026 FMECA Extension for CSDL includes:
 - G2026 FMECA Extension for CSDL Overview.ppt (this presentation)
 - GENESYS 2026 - FMEA Extension.gnsx
 - Includes: Schema extensions and Facilities, Hierarchy Definitions, Rule Sets, Table Definitions, and a Custom Ribbon addition (for the RPN script).
 - GENESYS 2026 - FMEA Sample.gnsx
 - Includes: The sample model depicted in this presentation. This project includes the Full FMEA extension.
 - Calculate_RPN.gnsx
 - Script for the Custom Ribbon button needed to calculate and return the Risk Priority Number (RPN)
 - folder32x32.png
 - Icon image for the Custom Ribbon button


Installing the “Calculate RPN” Custom Command

- A script tied to a custom command button is necessary to calculate the RPN for the selected Failure Modes
 - Script executes only on Failure Mode Entities
 - Execution on other classes will result in warning message
- **Start by importing:**
“Calculate_RPN.gnsx”




Installing the “Calculate RPN” Custom Command

- Select the **Manage the Custom Ribbon** button in the upper right hand of the Project Explorer window
- Select the **Add** button and add a new group titled, “FMEA”




Installing the “Calculate RPN” Custom Command

- Select the newly created FMEA Group and select **ADD** again
- Name the command “Calculate RPN”
- Set Image to the included “folder32x32.png” file
 - Place this file in your standard image location
- Select the **Run a Script** radio button
- Select the ellipses and navigate to the Calculate_RPN script
 - (Note your available scripts may be different)




Installing the “Calculate RPN” Custom Command

- Select OK
- Select OK on the Custom Ribbon menu




Running the “Calculate RPN” Command

- When one or more entities are selected in the browser the command becomes active
- When selected the RPN is calculated and placed in the RPN attribute




Running the “Calculate RPN” Command

- When selected the RPN is calculated and the user is notified of the calculated values
- The values are then placed in the RPN Attribute
 - Note: you may need to refresh the entity to see the newly calculated RPN attribute



Running the “Calculate RPN” Command

- When a Failure Mode does not have the required set of relationships the script does not calculate an RPN
 - User is warned in the results dialog box
 - Note the missing relations
 - Missing “created by” and “detected by” relations



An Example

Launch Vehicle – Ground Support System









Image source:

<https://global.jaxa.jp/activity/pr/jaxas/no082/03.html>

Helium Ground Support System for Launch Vehicle




Iterative FMECA Approach




Example – Update at Time $t = 1$

Comp N°	Component Name	FM N°	Failure Mode	FC N°	Failure Cause	Occ	FE N°	Failure Effect	Sev	FD N°	Failure Detection	difficultyOfDetectic	FP N°	Failure Preventic	RPN
HV.3	First Stage Helium Fill Valve	FM.1.2	HV-3 Valve Failed Closed	FC.3	Improper Command Sent	4 - Slight	FE.2	Inability to Fill First Stage Pneumatic Pressurization Tank	5 - Moderate	FD.2.2	HV-3 Limit Switch	2 - Very High	FPC.0	None	50
				FC.1	Material Decay of Component	5 - Low				FD.1.2	Pressure Comparison Upstream and Downstream of HV-3	5 - Moderate			
		FM.2.2	HV-3 Valve Failed Open	FC.2	Excessive Pressure in Upstream Element	4 - Slight	FE.1	Burst of Tube	9 - Serious	FD.2.2	HV-3 Limit Switch	2 - Very High	FPC.0	None	126
				FC.3	Improper Command Sent	4 - Slight	FE.5	Damage to downstream components	8 - Extreme	FD.1.2	Pressure Comparison Upstream and Downstream of HV-3	6 - Low			
HV.2	Helium Tank Remotely Controlled Isolation Valve	FM.1.1	HV-2 Valve Failed Closed	FC.3	Improper Command Sent	4 - Slight	FE.2	Inability to Fill First Stage Pneumatic Pressurization Tank	5 - Moderate	FD.2.1	HV-2 Limit Switch	2 - Very High	FPC.0	None	60
				FC.1	Material Decay of Component	6 - Medium	FE.3	Inability to Fill Second Stage Pneumatic Pressurization Tank	5 - Moderate	FD.1.1	Pressure Comparison Upstream and Downstream of HV-2	5 - Moderate			
		FM.2.1	HV-2 Valve Failed Open	FC.2	Excessive Pressure in Upstream Element	5 - Low	FE.1	Burst of Tube	9 - Serious	FD.2.1	HV-2 Limit Switch	2 - Very High	FPC.0	None	90
				FC.3	Improper Command Sent	4 - Slight	FE.5	Damage to downstream components	8 - Extreme	FD.1.1	Pressure Comparison Upstream and Downstream of HV-2	6 - Low			
				FC.1	Material Decay of Component	3 - Very Slight	FE.2	Inability to Fill First Stage Pneumatic Pressurization Tank	5 - Moderate						
							FE.3	Inability to Fill Second Stage Pneumatic Pressurization Tank	5 - Moderate						




Example – Update at Time $t = 2$

Comp. N°	Component Name	FM N°	Failure Mode	FC N°	Failure Cause	Occ	FE N°	Failure Effect	Sev	FD N°	Failure Detection	difficultyOfDetectic	FP N°	Failure Preventic	RPN
HV.3	First Stage Helium Fill Valve	FM.1.2	HV-3 Valve Failed Closed	FC.3	Improper Command Sent	4 - Slight	FE.2	Inability to Fill First Stage Pneumatic Pressurization Tank	5 - Moderate	FD.2.2	HV-3 Limit Switch	2 - Very High	FPC.0	None	50
				FC.1	Material Decay of Component	5 - Low				FD.1.2	Pressure Comparison Upstream and Downstream of HV-3	5 - Moderate			
		FM.2.2	HV-3 Valve Failed Open	FC.2	Excessive Pressure in Upstream Element	4 - Slight	FE.1	Burst of Tube	9 - Serious	FD.2.2	HV-3 Limit Switch	2 - Very High	FPC.0	None	126
				FC.3	Improper Command Sent	4 - Slight	FE.5	Damage to downstream components	8 - Extreme	FD.1.2	Pressure Comparison Upstream and Downstream of HV-3	6 - Low			
HV.2	Helium Tank Remotely Controlled Isolation Valve	FM.1.1	HV-2 Valve Failed Closed	FC.3	Improper Command Sent	4 - Slight	FE.2	Inability to Fill First Stage Pneumatic Pressurization Tank	5 - Moderate	FD.2.1	HV-2 Limit Switch	2 - Very High	FPC.0	None	60
				FC.1	Material Decay of Component	6 - Medium	FE.3	Inability to Fill Second Stage Pneumatic Pressurization Tank	5 - Moderate	FD.1.1	Pressure Comparison Upstream and Downstream of HV-2	5 - Moderate			
		FM.2.1	HV-2 Valve Failed Open	FC.2	Excessive Pressure in Upstream Element	5 - Low	FE.1	Burst of Tube	9 - Serious	FD.2.1	HV-2 Limit Switch	2 - Very High	FPC.0	None	90
				FC.3	Improper Command Sent	4 - Slight	FE.5	Damage to downstream components	8 - Extreme	FD.1.1	Pressure Comparison Upstream and Downstream of HV-2	6 - Low			
				FC.1	Material Decay of Component	3 - Very Slight	FE.2	Inability to Fill First Stage Pneumatic Pressurization Tank	5 - Moderate						
				FC.1	Material Decay of Component	3 - Very Slight	FE.3	Inability to Fill Second Stage Pneumatic Pressurization Tank	5 - Moderate						




Example – Update at Time $t = 3$

Comp No	Component Name	FM No	Failure Mode	FC No	Failure Cause	Occ	FE No	Failure Effect	Sev	FD No	Failure Detection	difficultyOfDetectic	FP No	Failure Preventic	RPN
HV.3	First Stage Helium Fill Valve	FM.1.2	HV-3 Valve Failed Closed	FC.1	Improper Command Sent	4 - Slight	FE.2	Inability to Fill First Stage Pneumatic Pressurization Tank	5 - Moderate	FD.2.2	HV-3 Limit Switch	2 - Very High	FPC.0	None	50
				FC.3	Material Decay of Component	5 - Low				FD.1.2	Pressure Comparison Upstream and Downstream of HV-3	5 - Moderate			
		FM.2.2	HV-3 Valve Failed Open	FC.2	Excessive Pressure in Upstream Element	4 - Slight	FE.1	Burst of Tube	9 - Serious	FD.2.2	HV-3 Limit Switch	2 - Very High	FPC.0	None	126
HV.2	Helium Tank Remotely Controlled Isolation Valve			FC.3	Improper Command Sent	4 - Slight	FE.5	Damage to downstream components	8 - Extreme	FD.1.2	Pressure Comparison Upstream and Downstream of HV-3	6 - Low			
				FC.1	Material Decay of Component	7 - Moderately High									
		FM.1.1	HV-2 Valve Failed Closed	FC.3	Improper Command Sent	4 - Slight	FE.2	Inability to Fill First Stage Pneumatic Pressurization Tank	5 - Moderate	FD.2.1	HV-2 Limit Switch	2 - Very High	FPC.0	None	60
				FC.1	Material Decay of Component	6 - Medium	FE.3	Inability to Fill Second Stage Pneumatic Pressurization Tank	5 - Moderate	FD.1.1	Pressure Comparison Upstream and Downstream of HV-2	5 - Moderate			
				FC.3	Excessive Pressure in Upstream Element	5 - Low	FE.1	Burst of Tube	3 - Slight	FD.2.1	HV-2 Limit Switch	2 - Very High	FPC.0	None	30
		FM.2.1	HV-2 Valve Failed Open	FC.3	Improper Command Sent	4 - Slight	FE.5	Damage to downstream components	3 - Slight	FD.1.1	Pressure Comparison Upstream and Downstream of HV-2	6 - Low			
				FC.1	Material Decay of Component	3 - Very Slight	FE.2	Inability to Fill First Stage Pneumatic Pressurization Tank	2 - Very Slight						
				FC.3	Excessive Pressure in Upstream Element	5 - Low	FE.3	Inability to Fill Second Stage Pneumatic Pressurization Tank	2 - Very Slight						
				FC.1	Material Decay of Component	3 - Very Slight									




Hierarchy Diagram View



Spider Diagram View

spider HV-2 Valve Failed Closed



Standard Table Definition

Comma N°	Component Name	FM N°	Failure Mode	FC N°	Failure Cause	Occ	FE N°	Failure Effect	Sev	FD No	Failure Detection	difficultyOfDetectic	FP N°	Failure Preventic	RPN
HV.3	First Stage Helium Fill Valve	FM.1.2	HV-3 Valve Failed Closed	FC.3	Improper Command Sent Material Decay of Component	4 - Slight 5 - Low	FE.2	Inability to Fill First Stage Pneumatic Pressurization Tank	5 - Moderate	FD.2.2 FD.1.2	HV-3 Limit Switch Pressure Comparison Upstream and Downstream of HV-3	2 - Very High 5 - Moderate	FPC.0	None	50
		FM.2.2	HV-3 Valve Failed Open	FC.2 FC.3 FC.1	Excessive Pressure in Upstream Element Improper Command Sent Material Decay of Component	4 - Slight 4 - Slight 7 - Moderately High	FE.1 FE.5	Burst of Tube Damage to downstream components	9 - Serious 8 - Extreme	FD.2.2 FD.1.2	HV-3 Limit Switch Pressure Comparison Upstream and Downstream of HV-3	2 - Very High 6 - Low	FPC.0	None	126
HV.2	Helium Tank Remotely Controlled Isolation Valve	FM.1.1	HV-2 Valve Failed Closed	FC.3 FC.1	Improper Command Sent Material Decay of Component	4 - Slight 6 - Medium	FE.2 FE.3	Inability to Fill First Stage Pneumatic Pressurization Tank Inability to Fill Second Stage Pneumatic Pressurization Tank	5 - Moderate 5 - Moderate	FD.2.1 FD.1.1	HV-2 Limit Switch Pressure Comparison Upstream and Downstream of HV-2	2 - Very High 5 - Moderate	FPC.0	None	60
		FM.2.1	HV-2 Valve Failed Open	FC.2 FC.3 FC.1	Excessive Pressure in Upstream Element Improper Command Sent Material Decay of Component	5 - Low 4 - Slight 3 - Very Slight	FE.1 FE.5 FE.2 FE.3	Burst of Tube Damage to downstream components Inability to Fill First Stage Pneumatic Pressurization Tank Inability to Fill Second Stage Pneumatic Pressurization Tank	3 - Serious 8 - Extreme 5 - Moderate 5 - Moderate	FD.2.1 FD.1.1	HV-2 Limit Switch Pressure Comparison Upstream and Downstream of HV-2	2 - Very High 6 - Low	FPC.0	None	90
System Context															
<div>Specific<div>↑General</div></div> <div>General<div>↑Specific</div></div> <div>Specific<div>↑General</div></div> <div>General<div>↑Specific</div></div>															

Wrap Up & Conclusions

- The GENESYS 2026 – Enhanced FMEA Extension for CSDL enables modelers to:
 - Execute FMECA in an integrated context within a system architecture model
 - Capture the design journey and traceability from elements generating **Failure Modes** through to **Mitigation Activities** back out to elements impacted by or changed by the FMECA
 - Model to the level of detail right for your project
 - Create libraries of **Failure Modes**, **Failure Causes**, **Failure Effects**, **Failure Detections**, and **Failure Prevention Controls** that your organization can leverage for other programs and analyses



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